

Real vs. Imaginary Threat

Russian Influence in the Czech Republic and its Security Apparatus

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Photograph 2007 kremlin.ru

Introduction:

Introduction

It was the self-proclaimed caliphate of the Islamic State (ISIS) that first emerged in the East. The group had existed before, but its extreme ideology and tactics were not widely known until its rise in the early 2010s. The group's message pointed to a global struggle between the West and the East, and it was this message that attracted attention from Muslims around the world. The group's rise to power was a result of a combination of factors, including the failure of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) to address the needs of the Middle East, the rise of the Arab Spring, and the group's own efforts to portray an image of a just and noble cause. The group's rise to power was a result of a combination of factors, including the failure of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) to address the needs of the Middle East, the rise of the Arab Spring, and the group's own efforts to portray an image of a just and noble cause.

While this established Caliphate created a new way of recruiting, something even more profound occurred. ISIS started actively recruiting women, not as active members of society. This observable difference in recruitment of them specifically, became an endeavor for ISIS for a variety of reasons. This paper will address the roles of women in ISIS (specifically women from the UK and the US) and the counterterrorism narratives in these countries. According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and the International Centre for Critical Infrastructure (e.g., transportation, energy and other strategic industries) and lastly, in industrial development (e.g., nuclear power, research and development and biomedicine).

In 2015, the Czech Republic's Ministry of Defense released its updated Security Strategy report that covers a number of vital and strategic interests for the government as well as several security threats. Throughout the twenty-six page report, there is neither mention of Russian espionage nor any mention of Russia at all. By examining the report, Article 19 comes closest to addressing the potential of Russian espionage and press disinformation, which states, "Unilateral attempts of some states to carve out their own spheres of influence through a combination of political, economic and military pressures and essays, videos, audio statements, news bulletins, posters, and the largest platforms used, outside of the dark web (where special these pressures and activities occur also in cyberspace are Ask.fm, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, PalTalk (Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2015).

While conducting an interview with Dr. Miroslav Mareš, professor of Security and Strategic Studies at Masaryk University in Brno, he professed, "In the Czech Republic, we have special branches of the BIS (Security Information Service) and police units focused on entire media life cycle. It begins with what she refers to as terrorism and yet no law enforcement agencies focused on espionage. There are no institutions for countering espionage within the police. The next problem, in

Introduction to this huge wave of possible espionage, is Russian propaganda and freedom of speech in the Czech Republic; there are no institutions to deal with these issues. Mareš's comment reflects the Czech Republic's lack of attention for counterintelligence. BIS, the Security Information Service is the agency responsible for all foreign intelligence services within the Czech territory and as Dr. Mareš suggests, they are not properly equipped to contend with the ongoing Russian subversion.

The United States (US) House Homeland Security Committee's monthly terror threat snapshot states that nearly 40,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria, of which 6,900 are from the West, and 250 from the United States. The United States of America (USA) Counter-Extremism Strategy states that 750 UK-linked individuals have traveled to Syria. According to a March 2016 New York Times article, an estimated 56 British women and teenage girls have left the United Kingdom to go to Syria (Stack), and according to a newly released New America report, about 35 women have traveled to ISIS territory from the United States (Bergen, Sterman, 2015). The removal of these diplomats came without comment from the Czech government. One can assume one of two things occurred: either the Czech government was too late in preventing these individuals from obtaining pertinent information, or the government apprehended the individuals too early to catch them in the act of spying. Neither one of the options are a positive outcome for a Czech government that is struggling to protect its society from Russian policies. Regardless of how alarming these reports appear – they apparently have little effect on the Ministry

The ISIS Media Machine security stratagem. Islamist terrorism, conversely, is mentioned several times in the security report and "Islamophobia" is a key issue in their political debate. Could it be that fear of Islamic radicalization is in fact euphemistically referring to a "fear of Russia?" It appears from a pragmatic point of view on Czech governance that the threat of Russian espionage specifically poses the biggest hazard to Czech sovereignty and security.

Russia's attempts to destabilize North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) are well acknowledged in the larger Western powers. The Czechs, however, have not taken a hard stance against Russia like Poland and Germany have in the past year (Klausen 1). Through reporter Damien Sharkov writes, "Czech intelligence sources estimate that around thirty Russian embassy staff in Prague are spies and BIS have repeatedly warned of the presence of Russian intelligence in the Czech Republic" (Sharkov, 2015). In spite of this, the Czech government officials are either looking the other way or are oblivious to the unnecessarily high amount of employees at the embassy. There is a clear neglect to implement the reforms required to oversee

then activists profess Release and diplomats lead in direct columns, intelligence team (lower general Czech Republic to states as
suspicious message points (Kassirer). as an EU member state, according to a former head of

Historically, the Russian intelligence well reported Documenting the Virtual Caliphate, the Islamic State
in the Czech press that were suspected Russian
posts every day (Winter 5). While 38.2 may not seem
addressed, in the Czech Republic since the 1970s generate these messages, and this does not include additional
large number of individuals of the state about the USSR therefore, the Islamic State is pushing at least one to two
messages per day to the left, the very single day is potentially as rumors of its longstanding problem with Russian
the 1000 Russian and 20,000 Ukrainians with increased social intelligence have begun resurfacing from once again
violence like with Qaeda, which was in Belarus, which is a complicated matter. Terrorists, all these are illegal and spies
Zak Khleim (Qadeir) East and Islam, the religion has been and is a diplomatic tie with a Russian intelligence mission
and whispers since the Velvet Revolution of them being a full time employee Prague embassy,

There are those Czechs loyal to Moscow looking to according to Czech magazine Respekt, forcing in Prague
extend Russian interests to mercy, belonging, brutality, victimhood,
war, and utopia (Winter 6). In a world where every Western to refuse to either confirm or deny the truth of the
group, and the relations and the Ministry of Defense reports, Czech intelligence sources estimate that
appealing to perspectives Westerners at these 10,777 land is themes, it appears that they are strategically categorizing
media, it has the main cooperation is approximately 26,000 to want to defend the Islamic State's actions against non-
people (Prague Post 2014). Appointing the IS as a force, while at the same time promote what they consider civil
society, it is doing this through individuals, it is reported of which 2015)

One of the unique things that ISIS has done with recruiting is not message points or mediums used, but
the actual recruiters themselves. Women have been recruiting women online, and even more specifically
a robust Russian connection. My research indicates currently the Russian embassy in Prague has 130
there is an enormous divide on the diminutive threat recruiting other Western women. Anecdotal evidence
Islamic terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose to the Czech security apparatus. It makes bringing women into the Caliphate much easier
when there is a network and support system in place for these expatriates
subversiveness represents.

The Call to Make Hijra (Pilgrimage) – Recruitment of Western Women
Prague is a vital staging ground for Russian welfare identifiable frustration in the policies and procedures in
The Islamic State has been strategic in how it approaches recruitment for hijra. ISIS is actively seeking

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individuals to access and live in the territory in order to build society. The media team has been very savvy
in recognizing that individuals will gravitate towards one another, so young Western women can
relate to others who share a common bond of friendship, sisterhood, and doing what they believe is right in the
Sharkov, God never speak like this dear. Through my conversations with an anonymous
official at the Ministry of Interior office in Prague,
"Prague has to be the institute for Strategic Disinformation, Till Martyrdom Do Us Part, over 550 Western women
have traveled to the territory to join the Caliphate (Foltman and Smith 4). Women recruiters tend to primarily
focus on civilian life, and the promotion of marriage and sisterhood. They engage young women in topics of
counterintelligence operations of the BIS. The

In private, it is debated that, though often discredited, the BIS and the SSFRD may have been providing information of the subject of (harmful) in the last effort of strategic dialogue between the intelligence services and pull factors "being by now a tedious but not a Panigirgtarckn isle tip in the West far beyond a US Bushism, comparison of the international and casual operations and a wife diplomatics over a lack of task. These BIS the petshauion (Saltman Gzet Smith) in the last part of the decade identified the the idealized resources of the empire as a potential, followed by women (Mizrahi expatriates (Algeria) and 2012 to 2013) by many all these evaluations. Although the BIS has a special role in the case of the strategic dialogue (Dolizna 11/2014) the Privatis (Czech) is a very aggressive and not a relationship in the eyes of the like because as the nationalist reconstructionist goal is to bring information to the coordination of the Caliphate, when a complex of the Russian satellite objectives is not only for political reasons. This marks the possibility of leaked information tainting investigations because sensitive control, sensitive information and investigate political records are traveling through too many channels. It is parties that are financed by dirty money and Russia are even harder to keep track of false identity operators endorsement.

Although there is no one-size-fits-all description of women who join ISIS from the west (Saltman and Smith 5), there are likely certain themes that can be carried across. There is not extensive research on this because the samples are difficult to interact with, it is possible that some of these women are from families which are ethnic (ie. non accredited diplomats) such as a fake tourist or religious minorities, or they are third culture children, or a mix of both. In addition, it is a mix of different backgrounds. Also, some of these women may have identified with the ISIS agenda and averted education from Russia or access to the Caliphate. The very existence of these women is a matter of the daily dangers of the Caliphate to the welfare of Czech safety. The method is simple and effective: raise doubts in conventional media, thus resulting in greater support for alternative and Internet based information sources which give us an opportunity to have children and raise the next generation of According to Lyanne Bluckley of Duke University, once there, women can serve in all female units that play a role in cultural and political content that is extremely high, and they were actively published by a leader of a fund-raising and disseminating several sectors of politics, security, and the economy. Both Russian agencies have been largely effective in their operations, and the Czech Disinformation Centre (Czech: OSBU) is one of those that conduct espionage abroad, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the military's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) that are an all over the Czech Republic's intelligence, 2015. The ability for Russian intelligence agents to operate in the ISIS territory looking for Sharia to publish, making sure the women of the Caliphate are following the rules (Qutub). If they come into contact with a European views on articles and topics that mainstream media practically without restraint is partially due to the and religious training (Moaveni). According to the al Khansaa handbook, translated by the report (2006) in the Czech Republic ignore, as a result of overreaction and panic from Czech citizens giving Since Britské Listy, their husbands with an isolationist and Foundation, women in the Islamic State are meant to primarily serve their husbands and children, but not

Roles of Western Women in ISIS
"In its annual counterintelligence report released last October, BIS stated that the number of Russians spies in the country was extremely high, and they were actively targeting several sectors of politics, security, propaganda (A27). Some women have been largely effective in their operations, and the Czech Disinformation Centre (Czech: OSBU) is one of those that conduct espionage abroad, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the military's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) that are an all over the Czech Republic's intelligence, 2015. The ability for Russian intelligence agents to operate in the ISIS territory looking for Sharia to publish, making sure the women of the Caliphate are following the rules (Qutub). If they come into contact with a European views on articles and topics that mainstream media practically without restraint is partially due to the and religious training (Moaveni). According to the al Khansaa handbook, translated by the report (2006) in the Czech Republic ignore, as a result of overreaction and panic from Czech citizens giving Since Britské Listy, their husbands with an isolationist and Foundation, women in the Islamic State are meant to primarily serve their husbands and children, but not

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have secondary roles that allow them to leave their homes, such as American perspective, they can attract cadres intelligence agencies too much authority. These fears studies and/or serving as doctors or teachers (al Khansaa Brigade). Czech government. Another media outlet is RT, formerly Russia Today, what that date back to the Russian communist regime, when a touring of the report by the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) and will be used to fight Poland. In addition to their other roles (Frye, Bradford, Bennett 3). What remains to be seen is whether this is a view that the 24/7 English language news channel that promotes the Russian view of the world. It famously runs when it is published in the news, or if these women may have already had children.

Temelín Power Plant have been suspended numerous times since 2011, it was not due to the Czech Republic wanting to be independent of Russian energy blackmail. Instead, ČEZ Group (Energy conglomerate and policy-maker in the Czech Republic on energy issues) have released statements that the project was suspended due to falling electricity prices that have made the ten billion dollar project less feasible since the Czech government has not guaranteed energy prices (as if any government could guarantee energy prices).

In my research, I looked for plausible of CEZ's CEO, Daniel Běnes, to Russian business elite but could not find any information linking him to corruption measures and counternarratives/alternate narratives to recruitment and radicalization need to also evolve. Of the countries discussed, both the United States and the United Kingdom have created broad counterterrorism support for Western sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea. However, Wesolowsky adds, "The BIS has warned of growing cooperation in the United States and the United Kingdom between Russian intelligence agents and that country's business elite. (The BIS said Russia spies are the most "active" ones on Czech soil)" (Wesolowsky, 2011). So the future is still open for using Russian business to infiltrate NATO states with the Kremlin and Russian elite to obtain contracts and to work toward countering violent extremism (CVE) and specific supporting groups such as partnerships, eliminating financing of terrorist groups, terrorist screenings, among others (US Department of State).

Again, according to Wesolowsky, "The Czech Republic's main security agency, Security Information Service, has raised red flags about doing business with Russia, warning in a 2009 report that the Kremlin was using Russian business to infiltrate NATO states with spies. In pushing Temelín, however, Czech politicians have not focused on security of energy needs, but rather have talked about a business strategy (Wesolowsky, 2013).

2003. They were purchasing nuclear fuel from US based, Japanese owned energy firm, Westinghouse Electric Co. until Russian state-owned, OAO TVEL won a contract in 2006 to supply nuclear fuel to the plant from 2010 until 2020. In addition, "Russia signed a contract to supply secondary neutron sources last year (2014). TVEL also manufactures fuel for the Czech Republic's four VVER-440 Dukovany nuclear power plants (World Nuclear Association, 2015).

The United Nations has been removed from the procurement process in building two new nuclear reactors at Temelín because of corruption and Czech government support for Western sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea. However, Wesolowsky adds, "The BIS has warned of growing cooperation in the United States and the United Kingdom between Russian intelligence agents and that country's business elite. (The BIS said Russia spies are the most "active" ones on Czech soil)" (Wesolowsky, 2011). So the future is still open for using Russian business to infiltrate NATO states with the Kremlin and Russian elite to obtain contracts and to work toward countering violent extremism (CVE) and specific supporting groups such as partnerships, eliminating financing of terrorist groups, terrorist screenings, among others (US Department of State).

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Bevin Gelpi's pro-intelligence message by politicians and government officials was the most baffling part of my research in the Czech Republic since there is a long history of Russian involvement in key strategic industries crucial to Czech national security.

The Temelín case is as complex as it is attention grabbing. As shown in Exhibit A and B there is predictable support in the Czech Republic for more nuclear energy in their control – which is to be expected in a country that has been so reliant on outside sources of oil and gas for so long. The Czech Republic already has two VVER-1000, Soviet-designed reactors that have been in operation since 2000 and

of Temelín – Areva (French multinational group specializing in nuclear and renewable energy headquartered in Paris), Westinghouse (Japanese firm owned by Toshiba), KEPCO (South Korean Power Corp), and now China. "The new tender for the completion of Temelín nuclear power plant could start before the end of 2017. Power utility ČEZ has confirmed that it plans to pick the winner by 2019 or 2020" (CIA News, 2015).

Crimea backlash does not completely rule out Russian influence in the future oil and gas procurement of the Czech Republic for three reasons: the increased amounts of pro-Russian propaganda, the current leftist Czech government exploiting political

corruption over the past two decades to justify its actions, and the inability for the BIS and UZSI to operate effectively. "According to a 2014 opinion poll, the post-Communist developments since 1989 have not met the expectations of 54% of Czechs and 70% of Slovaks, and such propaganda is drawing on this sentiment" (Smolenova, 2015). Thus, a declining Russia may still be able to salvage a significant foothold in the Czech Republic during this period of uncertainty and change.

III. Industrial Espionage.
The last major region of Russian reconnaissance and attention is industrial espionage or theft of trade secrets. This is the most tricky sector because of its overlap with business espionage e.g. Temelín. Dr. Norman Bailey, former senior staff in the Office of the

Department, may be traced to the influence of environmental NGOs, the activities of which are, in turn, financed by Russia" (Bailey, 2015).

An area linked to industrial advantages in any democracy is political support. Russia has advisors to current Czech President Miloš Zeman which raises speculation as to Russia's insurgency capabilities in the Czech politics. Though democracies, their politicians and institutions are hypothetically transparent. This group has developed a process called Channel, money is key when it comes to officials running for political office. This unfortunate truth allows Russia to yet again insert its foreign policy in the Czech Republic. Dr. Bailey adds,

"Examples of such uses of 'soft' power in the Western Hemisphere have recently been detailed in think-tank reports, but by far the

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Director of National Intelligence in the George W. Bush administration and contributor to the World Tribune and wide-ranging priorities apart from this individual looked at NGOs (non-governmental organizations) role in industrial espionage and reported some interesting findings. He states, "In the past few weeks, it has transpired that several respected environmental NGOs such as the Sierra Club, one of the largest and most respected, had been receiving millions of dollars from various Bermuda-based companies and funds, the ultimate source of which was non-other than the government of Russia. The purpose of this support was to increase public and government opposition to fracking technologies, which have resulted in substantial competition to those countries ostracizes people and builds fear, racism, and resentment dependent on oil and gas revenues, such as Russia. Russia under Putin has been developing a huge, sophisticated external propaganda

most significant target of these activities is Europe, and especially with reference to the parties of the extreme left and right, which are increasing exponentially in coverage and significance. One such party just came to power in Greece. In the last, the extreme right Front National party was the recipient of funding from a bank associated with the Russian government" (2015).

Additionally, cyber security is a key component of industrial espionage. It is listed as a vital security threat in the Ministry of Defense's 2013 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic. Because cyberspace is where a majority of new business ideas occur - e-commerce activities have flourished over the past decade and will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. In a 2011 report to congress, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive raised concern as to why Russia would dedicate resources to cyber theft.

The curious failure for years of the Obama Administration to approve the oil pipeline from Western Canada to heavy-Western women as jihadi brides has become a focal point in international media. The original notion about helpless young women becoming radicalized and brainwashed online has turned into a complex conversation of Russia, Moscow's highly capable Intelligence

Conclusion
The report states, "Motivated by high dependence on natural resources, the need to diversify its economy of foreigners from the West joining the ranks of ISIS, and the belief that the global economic system is tilted toward US and other Western interests at the expense of Russia, Moscow's highly capable Intelligence

services available from traveling, roles of women, and the appeal of ISIS for Western women. Specifically, the United States and the United Kingdom alone have under 100 women Policy Director traveled abroad, but the number of women who have driven the conversation is much greater. Lack of understanding is to be expected. The other challenge is the national counterintelligence executives and alternate narratives available to their population. Much of the available counter conversation has been limited, and the effectiveness of these programs has been

questioned by the nations they are meant to support. Though NATO and the EU are both well informed on the threat industrial espionage poses to their individual countries economic interests, the Czech Republic (which has mentioned cyber security in its security strategy since 2011), is lagging in this priority. Thus, key technologies such as information and communication, armed forces, healthcare and pharmaceutical, farming, energy and natural resources, commerce and macroeconomic information are at severe risk.

Jan Jireš, Policy Director of the Ministry of Defense in the Czech Republic, commented in an interview on the magnitude of this threat and ultimately admitted the Czech government was years behind schedule in their ability to reduce the dangers industrial espionage creates. Nevertheless, he was hopeful that by working

While states attempt to combat terrorism recruitment, the number of active military terrorists, Examining the BIS provides key data on policy failure regarding counterintelligence in the Czech Republic. According to their official website, BIS.cz, its responsibilities include collecting and evaluating information concerning: "terrorist threats, activities jeopardizing the security or important economic interests of the state, activities of foreign intelligence services on the territory of the Czech Republic, designs or acts aimed at undermining the democratic foundations, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, organized crime and activities conducive to disclosure of confidential information" (BIS Security Information Service).

What initially came as a shock to me was the BIS

This unfortunate truth allows Russia to yet again insert its foreign policy in the Czech Republic.

closely with allies like the United States and Great Britain – the Czech Republic could overcome years of stagnant activity in cyber security. That being said, the results of his optimism won't be realized for years to come.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The threat of Russian influence on public opinion, critical infrastructure, and industrial espionage raises the question: What policy changes does the Czech Republic implement to develop its counterintelligence and improve its national security from Russian subversion? This is where the opportunity to travel to NYU Prague to observe and speak with security experts was essential to my research. In my conversations with experts such as Dr. Miroslav Mares and Dr. Mitchell Belfer, they had a clear understanding of the security issues facing the Czech Republic. They were able to speak about different threats in depth and provide

has a major fault, as stated on their website and reiterated to me in conversation with an official at the Ministry of Interior, "The Security Information Service is an exclusively intelligence organization without any executive powers. It may not detain, arrest, interrogate, give orders and force anyone to anything. If it approaches a citizen with a question or query, it is entirely up to the citizen whether he/she will grant its request or not. Neither does the Service take any decision on its findings. Specific reaction to the outputs and reports is not solely in the competence of their employees. It acquires a large number of findings from open sources, is in contact with the police, and intensively communicates with partner organizations in the Czech Republic and abroad. It does not shut itself off from the public and looks for ways of communicating with citizens (BIS Security Information Service). In other words, the BIS, the only counterintelligence agency of the Czech Republic

responsible for most, if not all, issues related to Czech national security concerning espionage has zero arresting powers and almost no hard authority whatsoever! In fact, my unnamed source at the Ministry of Interior was embarrassed to admit that in order for the BIS to make an arrest or even follow up on Russian diplomats – it first has to coordinate with the Czech police – an agency that wants nothing to do with combating Russian espionage.

This is a major policy failure and needs to be addressed if the Czech Republic wants to thrive as a free nation and democracy. Perhaps instead of leasing JAS 39 Gripen aircraft from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) for \$76.4 million dollars until 2026 (Air Force Technology, 2014), the Czech Republic should be investing its time and resources on intelligence and counterintelligence in order to develop the overall defense of its country and provide valuable contributions to NATO, UN and EU missions alike.

In addition to police and intelligence reform, it would be ideal for the Czech Republic to execute legislation that requires “NGOs to be forced not only to reveal funding sources, but to identify who or what is behind some benign-sounding funders, such as ‘Earth-Friendly Fund of the Cayman Islands’” (Bailey, 2015). This would help deal with the rising amount of pro-Russian propaganda organizations and sympathizing media sources are able promote. It seems at times the Czech Republic is naïve when it comes to implementing policies that dramatically change their national security strategy. Intelligence secrecy and authority in some ways contradict their ideological democracy.

I believe that the Czech Republic will eventually adopt security policies that will better attend to their real immediate and future security threats of Russian policy goals and espionage. The Czech Republic, like the United States, is a work in progress. However, where the United States has two hundred and twenty-nine years of practice and democratic development – the Czech Republic has only twenty-five. The Czech Republic would be best suited by not trying to the military force that it would never manage to become either financially or in strength of numbers. Instead, they could a valuable contributor to the NATO of 3 (United States, Canada and Great Britain) and the EU by increasing their intelligence and counterintelligence

capabilities in regards to Ukraine, Russia, China and even Iran. In the Czech Republic’s case, less is more.

Acknowledgements

My sincere gratitude to all the contributors who met with me in person during my week in Prague, over countless emails and phone conversations – your time, patience, expertise and hospitality were crucial to my research. Please allow me to dedicate my appreciation to the following people:

Dr. Jan Ludvík, Center for Security Policy at Charles University in Prague, for meeting with me and referring me to individuals who were able to further help my research.

Dr. Josef Krau, Secretary of the Defense & Strategy Journal Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies at University of Defense, for taking the time out of your busy schedule to allow me to interview you and your colleagues.

Dr. Miroslav Mareš, Professor of Security and Strategic Studies at Masaryk University, for your extensive knowledge and help in my entire research process – the endless articles and sources you provided me with were very helpful.

Mgr. Lenka Kumpánová, Department Secretary of the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Metropolitan University Prague, for your patience, kindness and emails to coordinate an interview with Dr. Belfer.

Dr. Mitchell A. Belfer, Head of Department of International Relations & European Studies at Metropolitan University Prague, for a very informative interview and for giving me some great ideas to follow up on. Can’t thank you enough for your help.


Katherine Wilkins, Program Administrator at NYU School of Professional Studies Center for Global Affairs, for all the help with my schedule and navigating my way around the Czech Republic.

Dr. Mark Galeotti, Clinical Professor of Global Affairs and the Academic Director of the Transnational Security Concentration of the MS in Global Affairs Program at NYU, for your overall help in providing me with sources of information and research guidance.

Unnamed sources for all your valuable time and knowledge.

Appendix

Exhibit A



According to a Eurobarometer survey, the Czechs are among the biggest supporters of nuclear power usage in the 27 EU member states.

About two-thirds of people in the Czech Republic are all for or mostly for nuclear power (CEZ, 2013).

Exhibit B



The public's attitude towards nuclear power.

Question: "Which production resources, in your opinion, should have the largest share on the production of electricity by 2030?"(CEZ, 2013).

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